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Abstract—In a crowdsourcing market, a requester is looking to
form a team of workers to perform a complex task that requires a
variety of skills. Candidate workers advertise their certified skills
and bid prices for their participation. We design four incentive
mechanisms for selecting workers to form a valid team (that
can complete the task) and determining each individual worker’s
payment. We examine profitability, individual rationality, computa-
tional efficiency, and truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms.
Our analysis shows that TruTeam, one of the four mechanisms,
is superior to the others, particularly due to its computational
efficiency and truthfulness. Our extensive simulations confirm the
analysis and demonstrate that TruTeam is an efficient and truthful
pricing mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Future crowdsourcing platforms need to support collaboration
[1]. In a collaborative crowdsourcing market, a requester is
looking to form a team of workers who can perform a task that
requires a set of skills. Interested candidate workers advertise
their certified skills and bid prices for their participation. This
differs from usual team formation problems (e.g. [2], [3], [4])
in that it not only considers the skills required by the task and
possessed by the workers, but also involves economic incentives
and several criteria that guarantee profitability for requesters and
workers, social welfare, and truthfulness [5]. A large body of
research on crowdsourcing markets have confirmed the intuition
that financial incentives increase workers’ interest [6] and effort
level [7] as well as the attractiveness to experienced workers [8].
However, to the best of our knowledge, existing pricing models
(e.g. [9], [10], [11]) for crowdsourcing platforms only consider
individual workers without taking into account teamwork which
is crucial in collaborative environments [1].
In this paper, we design task allocation and pricing mecha-
nisms for selecting a team of workers in crowdsourcing markets.
We start by presenting two baseline mechanisms which pay
the selected workers the same as their bids. The first baseline
mechanism looks for the lowest-cost team by enumerating all
possible teams in a brute force manner. This mechanism is
profitable for both the requester and selected workers but is not
computationally efficient. It also does not ensure truthfulness or
incentive-compatibility, which means that workers may not bid
their true costs but can cheat to gain higher payments. We refer to
this baseline mechanism as OPT as it minimizes total payment
if all workers bid truthfully. We show that OPT is profitable,
individually rational but not efficient nor truthful.
The second baseline mechanism follows a greedy approach to
form a team of workers with low bids and high total expertise.
We refer to this mechanism as GREEDY and show that it is
efficient, profitable, individually rational but not truthful.
Both baseline mechanisms do not prevent workers from over-
bidding, which necessitates the need of designing mechanisms
in which workers will bid their true costs.
We first adapt the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction to
our problem, and refer to this mechanism as VCG. We show that
it is profitable, individually rational, truthful but not efficient.
Finally, we design a mechanism that combines the greedy
selection rule and a special payment scheme. A selected worker
receives a payment that equals to the highest bid she could
have placed and been selected. We refer to this mechanism as
TruTeam. It possesses all the above desirable properties, i.e.,
efficiency, profitability, individual rationality, and truthfulness.
Using synthetic scenarios, we evaluate the properties and
performance of these four mechanisms. The results show that
TruTeam is an efficient, truthful task allocation and pricing
mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing markets. In
summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on team
formation in collaborative crowdsourcing markets.
• We formulate the problem of team formation in crowd-
sourcing as an task allocation and pricing mechanism design
problem.
• We design two baseline and two refined mechanisms and
prove profitability, individual rationality, prove or disprove
truthfulness for each of the four mechanisms. In addition,
we also evaluate their computational complexity.
• We show via both analysis and extensive simulations that
TruTeam is an efficient, profitable, individually rational and
truthful mechanism for team formation in crowdsourcing
markets.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Pricing Mechanisms
Various models and techniques have been proposed for pricing
on crowdsourcing platforms. Budget-feasible mechanisms [12]
maximize a requester’s profit under a budget constraint while
satisfying other properties such as truthful bidding. In [9], the
authors designed a framework for task allocation and pricing
in an online environment. The framework aims to maximize
the number of tasks performed under a given budget or to
minimize payments for a given number of tasks. The authors
of [10] designed a no-regret posted price mechanism which
bridges the gap between procurement auctions and multi-armed
bandits. That mechanism satisfies budget feasibility, achieves
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near-optimal utility for the requester, and also guarantees that
workers bid their true costs. In [11], workers and tasks are
modeled as a bipartite graph where an edge (m,n) in the graph
represents worker n is willing to perform task m. The authors
designed a payment mechanism that ensures budget feasibility
and one-way-truthfulness while achieving near-optimal utility.
Recent work [13] considers variable rather than fixed payment
in crowdsourcing, as a function of the best worker’s effort, and
achieves a higher utility than the optimum achieved by fixed
payment. This idea was then extended to heterogeneous crowd-
sourcing environments [14] to tackle non-uniform knowledge
possessed by different workers.
B. Task Allocation and Team Formation
The task allocation problem is related to the job scheduling
problem which aims at minimizing the load of the machines
that have maximal work load. An extended version of the job
scheduling problem, in which each job needs to be performed
on a set of machines, was proved to be NP-hard [15].
The authors of [16] studied a new variant of the task allocation
problem in which the workers are connected in a social network.
The workers are assumed to only have local knowledge about
resources and hence each task can only be assigned to its
neighboring workers. The authors proved this problem to be NP-
hard and proposed a max-flow network model to solve it.
Team formation in a non-crowdsourcing environment (e.g.
social networks) was studied by [17], [4], assuming workers need
to communicate when performing a task and communication is
costly. The selected team has the skills to complete a task and has
minimum communication cost. A different metric, the workload
of workers, was studied by [2] when selecting a team to complete
a given task. The authors of [3] considered both workload and
communication costs when selecting a team to perform a task.
In this paper, we consider pricing mechanisms for the team
formation problem, which bridges the gap between budget-
feasible mechanisms and the traditional team formation problem.
We do not consider workload or communication costs but rather
focus on truthfulness which is more important in crowdsourcing
environments. In addition, our problem is more general than
prior work on budget-feasible mechanisms where a task is always
assigned to a single worker.
III. MODEL
A. Requester and Workers
In our model, a single requester posts her task to a crowd-
sourcing platform. The task has a value v which is the requester’s
revenue if the task is completed. There is a set of n available
workers W = {w1, ..., wn}, and the task needs a subset of
workers, S ⊆ W , to collaborate. When a worker signs up to
participate in the task, she should report to the requester what
skills she has and how much she expects to be paid. Then the
requester selects a set of workers and decides on the payment
for each of them.
Cost and bid of a worker. We assume that each worker’s
cost of doing the task is private information. Each worker wi
has a non-negative cost ci ∈ R≥0 to perform the task, and bids
bi ∈ R≥0 when she signs up to do the task.
We assume that a worker cannot lie about the skills that she
has. Some existing crowdsourcing platforms such as MTurk [18]
provided qualification test to ensure the validity of workers’
skills. A platform can also use work history information to verify
one’s skill.
Utility of the requester. The requester’s utility UR is the rev-
enue obtained from the completed task, subtracting the payment
to the selected workers.
UR =
{
v −∑wi∈S pi if task is completed
0 otherwise
(1)
where S is the set of selected workers and pi is the payment to
worker wi.
Utility of a worker. Worker wi’s utility ui is the payment she
receives subtracting her cost of performing the task.
ui =
{
pi − ci worker wi is selected
0 otherwise
(2)
Both the requester and the workers aim to maximize their
respective utilities.
B. Skill Profiles
The skill profile of the given task is an l-dimension vector
s∗ = (s∗[1], ..., s∗[l]), where s∗[i] = {0, 1} represents that the
ith skill is required (1) or not (0). We assume that a maximum of
l skills are required for any task. The skill profile of a worker wi
is also an l-dimension vector swi = (swi [1], ..., swi [l]), similarly
defined but representing what skills wi possesses.
The skill profile of a team sT = (sT [1], ..., sT [l]) is defined
by a logical OR of the skill profiles of all the individual workers
in the team T :
sT [j] =
∨
wi∈T
swi [j], j = 1, ..., l (3)
The team that can complete the task is the team that has all the
required skills of the task, i.e.,
sT [j] ≥ s∗[j], j = 1, ..., l (4)
C. Desirable Properties
Computational Efficiency. The task allocation and pricing
mechanism can be executed in polynomial time.
Individual Rationality. No worker is worse off if she is
selected to do the task. In other words, each selected worker
receives a payment no less than her true cost.
Profitability. The utility of the requester is non-negative.
Truthfulness (Incentive Compatibility). Bidding her true
cost is each worker’s dominant strategy. Formally, if ui and
u′i are the utilities of worker wi when bidding truthfully and
untruthfully, respectively, then a truthful mechanism guarantees
that ui ≥ u′i regardless of what other workers bid.
Theorem 1. An auction mechanism is truthful if and only if [12]:
• The allocation rule is monotone: If worker wi wins the
auction by bidding bi, she also wins by bidding b′i ≤ bi.
• Each winner is paid the threshold price: Worker wi will not
win the auction if she bids higher than this price.
D. Design Objectives
We want to design a task allocation and pricing mechanism for
the requester to select a team to complete a task she posts, with
the objective of minimizing the total payment to the selected
workers, i.e.,
S = arg min
T
∑
wi∈T
pi (5)
s.t. sT [j] ≥ s∗[j], j = 1, ..., l (6)
In addition, the mechanism should satisfy computational effi-
ciency, individual rationality, profitability and truthfulness.
IV. MECHANISMS
A. Optimal Mechanism
This mechanism selects the team with the lowest total bid that
is able to complete the task, by taking a brute-force approach to
attempt all the possible 2n − 1 teams (excluding the empty set)
of the n workers. We refer to this mechanism as OPT.
Lemma 1. OPT is individually rational, profitable, but not
computationally efficient or truthful. Time complexity of OPT is
O(2n).
The proof is deferred to [19] due to space constraint, as is
also the case for Lemma 2 and Theorem 2.
B. Greedy Mechanism
This heuristic mechanism selects the worker with the min-
imum cost per marginal skill contribution until a team that
can complete the task is formed or all the workers have been
considered. It pays each selected worker her bid.
In the above, wi’s marginal skill contribution, ∆i(S), is
defined with respect to an existing worker set S as the number
of uncovered skills that wi can cover if selected into S:
∆i(S) = sS∪{wi} · s∗ − sS · s∗ (7)
where sS is the skill profile of team S, and sS · s∗ is the inner
product of vectors sS and s∗. In each iteration, the GREEDY
mechanism always selects the worker who has the lowest cost
per marginal skill contribution, bi∆i(S) .
Lemma 2. GREEDY is computationally efficient, individu-
ally rational, profitable, but not truthful. Time complexity of
GREEDY is O(n2).
C. VCG-based Mechanism
We adapt the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism [5] to our problem, and design a mechanism called VCG.
Allocation rule. VCG selects the team with the lowest total
cost, i.e.,
S = arg min
T
∑
wi∈T
ci (8)
s.t. sS [j] ≥ s∗[j], j = 1, ..., l
Payment rule. VCG pays each selected worker wi the dif-
ference between the optimal welfare (for the other workers) if
wi was not participating and welfare of the other workers with
respect to the selected team:
pi = (min
T
∑
wj∈T∧wi /∈T
cj)−
∑
wj∈S∧j 6=i
cj (9)
s.t. sT [j] ≥ s∗[j], j = 1, ..., l
where S is defined in (8).
Lemma 3. VCG is individually rational, profitable, truthful,
but not computationally efficient. Time complexity of VCG is
O(n2n).
Proof. Suppose ui, u′i, pi, p
′
i are the corresponding utilities and
payments of wi, when she bids truthfully and untruthfully,
respectively. Let S, S′ denote the selected team when wi bids
truthfully and untruthfully, respectively.
u′i = p
′
i − ci
= (min
T
∑
wj∈T∧wi /∈T
cj)−
∑
wj∈S′∧j 6=i
cj − ci
= (min
T
∑
wj∈T∧wi /∈T
cj)−
∑
wj∈S′
cj
≤ (min
T
∑
wj∈T∧wi /∈T
cj)−
∑
wj∈S
cj
= ui
(10)
which proves the truthfulness. The proof of other properties are
deferred to [19] due to space constraint.
D. Efficient and Truthful Mechanism (TruTeam)
OPT is an optimal allocation mechanism if every worker
bids truthfully. GREEDY is computationally efficient but not
a truthful mechanism. VCG is a truthful mechanism but is not
computationally efficient.
In this section, we present the mechanism TruTeam (Mech-
anism 1) which satisfies all the four properties (i.e., TruTeam
is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and
truthful).
Mechanism 1: Efficient and Truthful mechanism for
Team formation (TruTeam)
Input: b1∼n, sw1∼wn , v, s∗
Output: S, p1∼n
1 S ← ∅; p1∼n ← 0;
2 repeat
3 wi ← arg minwi∈W\S bi∆i(S) ;
4 W ′ ←W\{S ∪ {wi}};
5 T ← S;
6 repeat
7 wj ← arg minwj∈W ′\T bj∆j(T ) ;
8 pi ← max{ bj∆j(T ) ×∆i(T ), pi};
9 T ← T ∪ {j};
10 until ∆i(T ) = 0 or v − pi < 0;
11 if v ≥ pi then
12 S ← S ∪ {wi};
13 v ← v − pi;
14 else
15 W ←W\{wi};
16 until sS cover s∗ or W\S = ∅;
17 if sS not cover s∗ then
18 S ← ∅; p1∼n ← 0
19 return (S; p1, ..., pn)
Allocation rule. In each iteration, it selects the worker who
has the smallest cost per marginal skill contribution, i.e., the
lowest bi∆i(S) . This is the same as GREEDY.
Payment rule. The intuition of the payment rule is to pay each
selected worker the highest cost she can report while still being
selected [11]. This is the “threshold price” stated in Theorem 1,
and we will show that overbidding under TruTeam does no good
to improve a worker’s utility.
Now, we explain in detail how to determine the payment to
each selected worker. When computing the payment to worker
wi, let’s see how this mechanism selects a team without wi’s
participation. It selects from set W\{T ∪ {wi}} (T is the
selected worker set before wi) the worker (wj1 ) who minimizes
the value bj∆j(S) . Therefore
bi ≤ bj1
∆j1(T )
×∆i(T ) (11)
Otherwise, if bi∆i(T ) >
bj1
∆j1 (T )
, we would have selected wj1
instead of wi according to the allocation rule of this mechanism.
Therefore, we set the payment to worker wi equal to this value:
p′i =
bj1
∆j1(T )
×∆i(T ) (12)
However, p′i may not be the highest bid that wi can report while
still being able to be selected, because T ∪{wj1} may not cover
all the skills required by the task. Suppose T∪{wj1 , wj2 , ..., wjk}
(without wi) is the set of workers selected according to this
mechanism. We set the payment equal to the following threshold
price as described in lines 6-10.
pi = max
j∈{j1,j2,...,jk}
{ bj
∆j(T )
×∆i(T )} (13)
Note that, T is updated every time by including a new worker
wjx (x = 1, 2, ..., k), i.e., T = T ∪ {wjx}.
In order to be profitable, wi is selected to perform this task
only if the task’s remaining value is not less than pi (we also
update the set of selected workers as S = S∪{wi}), as shown in
lines 11-13. Otherwise we skip wi and consider next candidate
worker as described in lines 14-15.
Repeat the above process until the task can be completed by
the set of workers S or all the workers have been considered.
Lemma 4. TruTeam is computationally efficient, with a time
complexity of O(n2l).
Proof. Selecting the worker who has the minimal value bi∆i(S)
takes O(n) time. Deciding the payment for the selected worker
takes O(nl). Since there are n workers, time complexity of this
mechanism is O(n2l).
Lemma 5. TruTeam is individually rational.
Proof. From the above payment rule, we can see that for any
selected worker wi.
bi ≤ bj1
∆j1(S)
×∆i(S)
≤ maxj∈{j1,j2,...,jk}{
bj
∆j(T )
×∆i(T )}
= pi
(14)
We assume a worker will not bid bellow her true cost, i.e. bi ≥ ci
(In fact, we will show in Lemma 7 that bi = ci ). Therefore, wi’s
utility is ui = pi − ci ≥ pi − bi ≥ 0.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF OUR TWO DATASETS
n: no. of workers l: no. of skills (u, σ) [C1, C2]
Small n = 10 ∼ 25,
fixing l = 5
l = 1 ∼ 10,
fixing n = 20
(l/3, 0.4) [1, v/5]
Large n = 10 ∼ 3000,
fixing l = 50
l = 1 ∼ 100,
fixing n = 1000
(l/5, 0.4) [1, v]
Lemma 6. TruTeam is profitable.
Proof. Every time when a worker is considered, we check if the
remaining value of the task can cover the payment to this worker.
If not, the worker will not be selected. This process guarantees
that the value of this task is more than the total payment to the
whole team.
Lemma 7. TruTeam is truthful.
Proof. According to Theorem 1, we need to prove that (1) the
allocation rule is monotone and (2) the payment to each selected
worker wi is the threshold price pi.
The monotonicity of the allocation rule is obvious, since if wi
is selected, she will also be selected by bidding a smaller value
which leads to a smaller cost per marginal skill contribution.
For the threshold price, recall pi from equation (13). If bi > pi,
wi will be placed after the last selected worker, thus she will not
be selected to perform the task. Therefore, pi is the threshold
price.1
Theorem 2. TruTeam is computationally efficient, individually
rational, profitable and truthful.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the performance of the four
mechanisms, namely OPT, VCG, GREEDY and TruTeam in
terms of the following metrics:
• Running Time: the actual CPU time on a computer.
• Requester’s Utility: defined in Eqn. (1).
• Truthfulness: We verify the truthfulness of TruTeam by
evaluating workers’ utility if they overbid or underbid.
A. Simulation Setup
We generate two different datasets to evaluate our mecha-
nisms. A Small dataset is used to evaluate all the four mecha-
nisms and a Large dataset is used to evaluate the two compu-
tationally efficient mechanisms (i.e., GREEDY and TruTeam).
The parameters of the two datasets are listed in Table I and
explained bellow.
We set the value of the task v = 500 which is unknown to
workers. Each worker’s true cost ci is uniformly drawn from
[C1, C2]. In the case that all workers are truthful, we set bi = ci.
In the case of overbidding, we randomly select k ∈ [1, n] workers
and let each of them overbid a random value ri (i.e., bi = ci+ri)
where ri ∈ [1, v]. We do not consider underbidding, since no
rational worker will underbid under these four mechanisms.
To generate each worker’s skill profile, we first generate the
number of skills she has, using the normal distribution (u, σ).
Suppose wi has x skills, then we randomly assign x different
skills out of all the l skills to her.
1Bidders will not underbid, either. The intuition is that if wi underbids and is
selected, her payment will not cover her cost. See [19] for the details.
All the simulations were run on a Windows PC with a
3.40GHz CPU and 8 GB memory. Each data point is averaged
over 100 measurements.
B. Results
Fig. 1 shows the comparison of the four mechanisms con-
ducted over the Small dataset. We observe in Fig. 1 (a,b,c,d) that
OPT and VCG do not scale well when the number of workers or
skills becomes large. However, all the four mechanisms achieve
strictly positive requester’s utility (e,f,g,h). Therefore, in this
section, we focus on the computationally efficient mechanisms,
GREEDY and TruTeam, and explain in detail the results per-
taining to them collected on the Large dataset.
1) Running Time: The results are presented in Fig. 2 (a,b,c,d).
Generally, as the number of workers or the number of skills
increases, running time of both mechanisms increases. Although
GREEDY outperforms TruTeam, since the payment determi-
nation process of TruTeam is more complicated than that of
GREEDY, TruTeam maintains a high efficiency. For example,
it completes in about 0.6 second even when the number of worker
reaches 3000. More importantly, TruTeam ensures truthfulness
which is crucial to incentive mechanisms to counteract possible
cheating behaviors in practice.
In Fig. 2(a) and 2(b), running time of TruTeam contains a
small peak when the number of workers is between 100 and
300. This happens when the task is complex (requiring skills as
many as l = 50) and the number of workers is relatively small
(n < 300). Thus the team size is fairly large and TruTeam needs
to check every other worker’s bid and skills when deciding the
payment to each selected worker, resulting in higher running
time.
2) Requester’s Utility: Fig. 2 (e,f,g,h) present the requester’s
utility in different settings. Generally, the requester’s utility
increases as the number of worker increases (e,f), since the
requester has more “cheaper” workers to select from. On the
other hand, the requester’s utility drops as the number of required
skills becomes larger (g,h), which is a natural result of the
increase of complexity of the task.
In the case of truthful bidding, as is shown in Fig. 2(e) 2(g),
the untruthful mechanism (GREEDY) yields higher utility than
the truthful mechanism (TruTeam) because TruTeam pays each
selected worker no less than her bid.
However, in the case of overbidding which is a more re-
alistic setting, Fig. 2(f) 2(h) show that TruTeam outperforms
GREEDY. This demonstrates that in real crowdsourcing markets
where workers are strategic and speculating higher payment (e.g.,
by trying to overbid), TruTeam generates higher profit for the
requester by ensuring truthful bidding.
3) Truthfulness: Lastly, we verify the truthfulness of
TruTeam by examining the utilities of two randomly chosen
workers, w637 and w219. We set n = 1000 and l = 50, and
their true costs are c637 = 4 and c219 = 10, respectively. In
Fig. 3(a), we observe that w637 is selected to perform the task
if she bids her true cost c637 = 4, and her utility reaches the
optimal value 7. If she overbids a value no less than 11, she is
not selected and therefore her utility drops to 0. In Fig. 3(b), it is
observed that w219 is not selected to do the task if she bids her
true cost c219 = 10, and hence her utility is 0. This is the optimal
utility she can get because even though she can be selected to
do the task, which only happens if she under bids (below 7), her
payment will not be able to cover her true cost and hence she
will receive a negative utility, as indicated in Fig. 3(b).
TruTeam ensures that it is every worker’s dominant strategy
to bid her true cost in order to maximize her utility.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulate team formation in crowdsourcing
as a task allocation and pricing problem, and provide four
candidate mechanisms as solutions: OPT, GREEDY, VCG, and
TruTeam. We prove that although all the four mechanisms
satisfy profitability and individual rationality, only VCG and
TruTeam satisfy truthfulness, and only GREEDY and TruTeam
are efficient. Simulation also demonstrate that TruTeam is the
only one, among the four candidates, that is efficient, profitable,
individually rational and truthful.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on
team formation in collaborative crowdsourcing markets. Future
research could be in the direction of taking into account the
quality of contribution [20] and trustworthiness of workers [21]
when selecting and rewarding workers, or considering previous
collaborations among workers and inter-dependency among mul-
tiple tasks when forming multiple teams.
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Fig. 1. Simulation results on the Small Dataset.
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Fig. 2. Simulation results on the Large Dataset.
0 4 8 12 16 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Utility of Worker 637
Bid (c=4)
u
63
7
(a) Utility of Worker w637
0 4 8 12 16 20
−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
Utility of Worker 219
Bid (c=10)
u
21
9
(b) Utility of Worker w219
Fig. 3. Workers’ Utilities.
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